Showing posts with label knowleage. Show all posts
Showing posts with label knowleage. Show all posts
Thursday, June 10, 2010
期指高低水和後市關係
期貨價都有一個理論價，使期貨和現貨掛，公式如下：期貨價格 = 現貨價格 + 所得利益 - 失去利益以期指為例，持正股可收取股息，持現金可收取銀行利息，買入期指是變相持有四十三隻成分股，但卻無法收取股息，但可以把多餘的現金存入銀行收取利息。以兩者回報相同計，期指合理值等於恒指現值加上合約期間合約總值的無風險利率回報的恒指折算值，扣除合約期間藍籌股息除淨的恒指折算值，公式如下：期指理論價格 = 恒生指數 + 利息收益 - 股息收益5月為股息派發高峰期，股息派發愈多，期指呈低水程度愈低；銀行利率愈高，期指呈高水程度愈高。現在是股息遠高於銀行利率，所以經常出現大低水。
Wednesday, June 9, 2010
如何读财务报表/财务陷阱初探
如何读财务报表/财务陷阱初探(2008-07-26 17:39:17)转载
标签：杂谈
我不懂财务，也不懂会计，但我能马马虎虎、毛估估看懂财务报告。大多数人总是强调自己因为不懂财务知识而看不懂财务报告，所以不愿意去研究分析财务报告，给自己一个不看财务报告的借口，其实是不应该的。作为价值投资者，不管你懂不懂财务，你必须去看财务报告。否则，我只能说你是比我更懒惰而已。至于懂不懂财务这个问题，有一句话是那样说的：“熟读唐诗三百首，不会作诗也会吟”（大意），就是这个道理，其实，这里有一个熟能生巧的问题。如果你把每天四个小时看行情的时间花在看财务报告上面，我相信，一年以后你就肯定能看懂财务报告的。对于价值投资者，最重要的事情就是关心基本面，看盘是无关紧要的。呵呵，如果我有时间看盘，那么我喜欢玩游戏去，毕竟玩游戏比看盘省力。
对了，说一句题外话：如果你适合、喜欢价值投资，那么我建议你去学习一点企业经营、管理的专业性教材文章，一般来说在经营管理的教材中有财务方面的基本知识，懂得一点企业的经营管理对于了解、分析、判断上市公司的价值是非常有帮助的。希望你能把自己在企业经营管理方面提高至专科生的水平，那么就差不多够用了。告诉你吧，我是搞企业出身，吹牛的说是经营管理的行家。
说实话，因为我不懂财务，所以我采用的是笨办法来分析的，今天我就和你说说这个笨办法，不知道你有没有兴趣？
1，拿到财务报告后，首先是浏览一遍，看看有没有特殊的地方，特别是那个董事会报告或者是管理层分析，还有那个固定资产的投资情况（产能扩张情况），当然，那时候每股利润什么的应该已经看见了的。如果他并没有什么，市盈率在同行业中也没有什么优势，那么就让他去吧，以后有时间再说。
2，对于重点（自己买进的）公司，就应该采集数据，分离、计算出季度数据，进行公司每一个季度的纵向对比及与同行业的横向对比。我一般所采集的数据是生产量，销售量，主营收入，主营成本，主营利润，三项费用，营业利润，投资利润，利润总额，少数股东损益，所得税，净利润，库存，应收帐款、现金流量等等。通过这些数据，再计算自己所需要的分析数据，再进行纵向以及横向对比。我对于重点公司，一般建立一个WORD文件，搜集文字资料，建立一个EXCeL文件，用于采集、计算、分析对比数据。在分析数据的过程中，应注意几个方面：
A，非经常性损益项目，非经常性损益项目一般包括资产处置损益，政府一次性补贴，一次性投资损益，减值准备的转回，营业外损益等等，这些数据基本上都是一次性的，所以影响的净利润要加以区别。比如说民生银行的第三季度大量增加的坏帐拨备，引起民生银行第三季度净利润增长幅度的减少，市场人士就认为民生银行不行了，我就明确说，这是由于坏帐拨备的原因，与净利润的增长没什么关系，公司目前的预增公告显示，06年的净利润增长率在40％左右，继续维持高增长的趋势。比如说000708第二季度的一次性以前年度计提的减值准备的转回9170万元，占上半年利润19636万元的47％，这个就不应该计算的，因为这是一次性的。可那些市场人士偏偏就不会看见这个数据的存在。比如说鞍钢的资产处置损失17099万元就影响了第三季度的利润，我估计鞍钢第四季度的资产处置损失会继续增加，因为淘汰设备的原因，但这些都是一次性的，应该就需要区别对待，或者说应该在当期利润中增加或减少。
B，所得税的变化，以前把这个所得税减免是放在非经常性项目里面的，就可以一目了然，现在不是了，所以得关心所得税率的变化，计算出当期的所得税抵扣。所得税的变化主要的是国产设备所得税的抵扣（技术改造中国产设备投资额的40％，可以在与去年同比增加的利润中进行所得税抵扣，即免所得税），这个也是需要注意的地方，有些企业是均衡在每季度记帐，有些企业在当期计算抵扣，有些企业在收到了退税以后一次性记帐，这个就需要认真判断的。还有就是折旧率变化引起的所得税变化，比如说华泰股份就是个极端的例子，他在缴纳所得税的折旧费是按照那个什么“加倍折旧法”（我忘记了具体的说法，请行家给我解释一下这个情况，谢谢！）来计算利润额的，但在公布的财务报告中是按照平常的折旧率计算的，所以他的所得税率就大大的低于正常情况下的缴纳所得额，但这个现在减少的所得税在以后还是需要拿出去的。
C，数据的连续性、稳定型及成长性，一个好公司在行业景气度平稳的情况下，应该保持其连续性、稳定型及成长性，假如某一数据发生异动，那么就得找原因，明白是为什么？尽可能的做到心中有数，假如一个公司经常的数据异动，那么就得怀疑公司报表的真实性及管理层的能力问题。有关数据的变化应该与行业景气度、产能的扩张情况吻合，否则就得找原因。
D，公司管理费用的异动，一般来说管理费用会慢慢的平稳的增长，假如一下子大幅度波动，那么就说明有问题，不是操纵利润就是管理上有问题，产能的扩张一般来说也不会大幅度增加管理费用的，当然，这里也有由于记帐科目的变化引起的。
E，应收帐款的异动，应收帐款的大幅度增加，一般来说说明销售方面产生问题，当然，也有可能是销售政策的变化，应注意财务报告的附注说明。说明有可能行业景气度产生变化，说明公司未来的成长性有问题，甚至是做假的可能。
F，库存情况的异动。一般来说就是说明公司销售有问题，也有可能是做假的需要，关心一下财务报告的附注说明，如果没有合理的说明，那么就应该警惕。
G，公司计划的完成情况，这个是属于考察管理层能力的方面。一般来说，公司的预测计划都是相对谨慎的，不会信口开河。也就是说，一个好公司应该是一年的经营情况好于年初的计划预测，如果不能完成计划，如果大幅度超过计划，都不是好的现象，最起码说明你管理层没能力对于市场进行预测，特别是对于生产量预测的大幅度偏离。作为一个大公司的管理层，不能相对准确的预测市场以及不能掌握自己的生产量都是无能的体现。如此，你如何应对千变万化的市场？你如何面对生产管理？你如何进行公司的远期规划？所以，我对于钢铁业中的武钢、太钢的管理层投了不信任票。
财务陷阱初探
财务报表是基本面分析的重要工具，同时财务报表存在着众多的陷阱。财务数据造假与合法的财务调整都能误导投资者，我们不能指望所有上市公司的管理层都能遵纪守法如实地反映企业的经营情况。要避开财务陷阱，就要对上市公司玩弄的财技有所了解，找出需要关注的重点。
正常情况下，经营性现金流应随净利润增加同步增长。如果经营性现金流增长持续落后于净利润增长，则需要小心。造成这种情况的原因很多，如企业为获得更多的业务而放松信贷条件，业务扩张过快存货激增等。这些都可能会给企业经营带来潜在的风险。对于自由现金流差的情况，具有反身性特点的公司比较特别。这类公司资金需求度很强，一般属于轻资产型公司，高速扩张的过程中，利润几乎全部被转化为再投资，自由现金流数据不会很优秀。与重资产公司不同，轻资产型企业再投资用于快速复制盈利单位，融资过程中保持很高的资本回报率，也就是再投入资本不断为股东创造更高的价值。重资产型公司则通常资金利用效率低下，再投资资本回报率比资本成本还低，长期而言资本支出侵蚀企业价值。
非经常性损益包括股权转让、股票投资收益、公司重组费用等一次性损益。非经常性损益可以突发性增减盈利，一般不会影响公司的长期发展，分析净利润数据时应剔除这部分收益。值得注意的是，企业可以把经营活动中发生的费用隐藏在非经常性损益中，而且允许存在较大误差，掩盖经营过程中的问题。投资者应该把这些费用拆分并分析是否真正是非经营性的，若其中隐含了经营性费用则要评估对企业长期发展的影响。
资产周转率对资产收益率有重要影响，资产周转率降低可能就意味着资产收益率降低。存货也是重点考察对象，存货激增可能是企业对销售过于乐观，也可能是产品滞销。
若应收帐款比营业收入增长快，说明公司的信用条款比较宽松，越来越多的帐款被作为赊销，借出去的现金不一定能全部和及时收回，隐含损失部分现金和不能及时收回而影响正常运作的风险。应收帐款占比过高也面临同样的风险。坏帐准备是反映企业预期有多少帐款会被赖帐而设定的损失准备，一定程度可以反映部分赊账回收情况。另外值得关注的还有其它应收款，很多企业什么东西都往里装。许多无法入帐的东西都放在这个科目里。如被占用的上市公司资金经常挂在其它应收款下，形成难以收回的资产。另外净利润增长率数年持续超过主营收入增长率也是值得关注的现象，需要探究其盈利增长真正的动力何在。
各种费用的计提、坏帐准备和折旧是调节净利润的重要手段。坏帐准备与应收帐款有一定关联性，若应收帐款大幅增加而坏帐准备没有相应提高，说明企业对应收帐款的回收过于乐观，会形成一定的风险。若坏帐准备突然大幅度增加，要么是有意隐瞒利润，要么应收帐款回收出现大问题。调节费用计提和折旧摊销同样能轻易调节净利润，如增加折旧年限、把费用性支出作为资本支出进行摊销、刻意减少存货跌价准备、先大幅计提再释放利润等。这些数据出现异常就要找出真正的原因。
无形资产是指企业长期使用而没有实物形态的资产，包括专利权、非专利技术、商标权、著作权、土地使用权、商誉等，其中商誉的弹性最大。超过企业账面价值的那部分就是商誉，合并商誉等于购入成本与标的净资产公允价值之差。商誉的可调节范围很大且难于评估，因此企业操纵商誉的自由度很大。
股权投资和债券投资反映在资产负债表上的价值可能与其实际价值有较大差异。若投资占总资产比例很高时，我们就要注意弄清楚它的实际价值，股权投资的风险更大。
上市公司与母公司控制的其它子公司之间，可能存在错综复杂的关联关系与交易。关联企业之间进行非实质性交易，构造循环陷阱，实现操纵收入和提升利润，也存在利益输送、大股东掏空上市公司的可能。上市公司与其大股东之间还可以通过往来资金（其它应收款、其它应付款）来改善原本难看的经营性现金流。本来关联企业的往来资金往往带有融资性质，但是借款方并不作为短期借款或者长期借款，而是放在其它应付款中核算，作为贷款方不作为债权，而是在其它应收款中核算，这样经营性现金流量净额就可能被夸大。
不同行业的企业有不同的收入确认原则和时间，通过收入确认的时间差和灵活运用确认原则，可以把利润在不同的财政年度中来回捣腾。一些财务数据的伪装需要很长时间才能慢慢显现出来，投资者要对数年的财务报表综合分析研究才能发现其中的猫腻。
担保是一个可能带来致命性结果的大陷阱。若担保的金额较大，被担保公司赖帐或没有偿还能力，则可能带来灭顶之灾。
财务陷阱真可谓是纷繁复杂，令人防不胜防。以上提到也许只是冰山一角，欢迎各位朋友特别是专业人士深入探讨和补充。
对几个最重要的财务指标的理解
净资产收益率
净资产收益率是净资产创造价值能力的体现，也是能真正如实反映企业经营情况的指标。投资的本质就是赚钱，投入多少钱，每年能赚多少，是最直观的。所以净资产收益率是反映企业盈利能力最重要的指标。另外，高净资产收益率表明企业具备获取超额利润的能力，这种情况如果能持续，说明企业拥有一定的壁垒，ROE越高表明壁垒越强大，未来持续获得超额利润的可能性也越大。无论什么行业，ROE的标准都应该是统一的。若行业整体ROE都低，则表明这个行业不值得投资。
净利润增长率
净利润增长率是反映企业成长性的重要指标之一。但高净利润增长率并不代表股东一定能获得高回报，具体情况具体分析。如果成长要依靠不断融资才能实现，而ROE不能保持或同步提高，则表明股权的稀释降低了成长为股东创造的价值，投资者未必能获得高回报。另外要考察成长的质量高不高，是否能持续等。所以净利润增长率并不能很直观地反映企业真实本质的情况，要结合其他基本面才能较好地进行判断。否则很容易掉进高增长陷阱。
毛利率
毛利率是考察企业盈利能力的一个重要的指标，不同行业毛利率差别较大，当然越高越好，象茅台这样毛利率高达50％以上的企业，很可能就是好的投资标的。由于净利率可以通过费用控制或其他手段进行调整，不能直观地反映企业产品的竞争力，而毛利率避免了这些影响，能直接反映企业的盈利能力和竞争力，高毛利率通常是拥有壁垒的特征之一。高毛利率不代表高的净利率，如果企业费用控制不当或者行业的特殊性会造成高毛利率低净利率的现象。如服务性行业一般毛利率都较高，但具体企业净利率却千差万别，这与企业的经营效率和费用控制能力有较大的相关性。
净利率
净利率比较综合地反应企业盈利能力，是影响企业实际营运绩效的主要指标。通常净利率越高越好，但不同行业净利率应有不同的标准。有些行业净利率很低，但资产周转率高、营业收入高，则一样很有投资价值，家电连锁业就是典型代表。
负债率
负债率过高意味着高风险，企业的负债支付的能力很重要，一旦周转出现问题，可能牵涉到企业的存亡。有时高负债率不一定代表高风险，深入分析才能得出正确的结论。例如若应付帐款很高造成的高负债率有时还是好现象，表明企业可能对供应商处于强势地位，当然这个也要具体问题具体分析。
标签：杂谈
我不懂财务，也不懂会计，但我能马马虎虎、毛估估看懂财务报告。大多数人总是强调自己因为不懂财务知识而看不懂财务报告，所以不愿意去研究分析财务报告，给自己一个不看财务报告的借口，其实是不应该的。作为价值投资者，不管你懂不懂财务，你必须去看财务报告。否则，我只能说你是比我更懒惰而已。至于懂不懂财务这个问题，有一句话是那样说的：“熟读唐诗三百首，不会作诗也会吟”（大意），就是这个道理，其实，这里有一个熟能生巧的问题。如果你把每天四个小时看行情的时间花在看财务报告上面，我相信，一年以后你就肯定能看懂财务报告的。对于价值投资者，最重要的事情就是关心基本面，看盘是无关紧要的。呵呵，如果我有时间看盘，那么我喜欢玩游戏去，毕竟玩游戏比看盘省力。
对了，说一句题外话：如果你适合、喜欢价值投资，那么我建议你去学习一点企业经营、管理的专业性教材文章，一般来说在经营管理的教材中有财务方面的基本知识，懂得一点企业的经营管理对于了解、分析、判断上市公司的价值是非常有帮助的。希望你能把自己在企业经营管理方面提高至专科生的水平，那么就差不多够用了。告诉你吧，我是搞企业出身，吹牛的说是经营管理的行家。
说实话，因为我不懂财务，所以我采用的是笨办法来分析的，今天我就和你说说这个笨办法，不知道你有没有兴趣？
1，拿到财务报告后，首先是浏览一遍，看看有没有特殊的地方，特别是那个董事会报告或者是管理层分析，还有那个固定资产的投资情况（产能扩张情况），当然，那时候每股利润什么的应该已经看见了的。如果他并没有什么，市盈率在同行业中也没有什么优势，那么就让他去吧，以后有时间再说。
2，对于重点（自己买进的）公司，就应该采集数据，分离、计算出季度数据，进行公司每一个季度的纵向对比及与同行业的横向对比。我一般所采集的数据是生产量，销售量，主营收入，主营成本，主营利润，三项费用，营业利润，投资利润，利润总额，少数股东损益，所得税，净利润，库存，应收帐款、现金流量等等。通过这些数据，再计算自己所需要的分析数据，再进行纵向以及横向对比。我对于重点公司，一般建立一个WORD文件，搜集文字资料，建立一个EXCeL文件，用于采集、计算、分析对比数据。在分析数据的过程中，应注意几个方面：
A，非经常性损益项目，非经常性损益项目一般包括资产处置损益，政府一次性补贴，一次性投资损益，减值准备的转回，营业外损益等等，这些数据基本上都是一次性的，所以影响的净利润要加以区别。比如说民生银行的第三季度大量增加的坏帐拨备，引起民生银行第三季度净利润增长幅度的减少，市场人士就认为民生银行不行了，我就明确说，这是由于坏帐拨备的原因，与净利润的增长没什么关系，公司目前的预增公告显示，06年的净利润增长率在40％左右，继续维持高增长的趋势。比如说000708第二季度的一次性以前年度计提的减值准备的转回9170万元，占上半年利润19636万元的47％，这个就不应该计算的，因为这是一次性的。可那些市场人士偏偏就不会看见这个数据的存在。比如说鞍钢的资产处置损失17099万元就影响了第三季度的利润，我估计鞍钢第四季度的资产处置损失会继续增加，因为淘汰设备的原因，但这些都是一次性的，应该就需要区别对待，或者说应该在当期利润中增加或减少。
B，所得税的变化，以前把这个所得税减免是放在非经常性项目里面的，就可以一目了然，现在不是了，所以得关心所得税率的变化，计算出当期的所得税抵扣。所得税的变化主要的是国产设备所得税的抵扣（技术改造中国产设备投资额的40％，可以在与去年同比增加的利润中进行所得税抵扣，即免所得税），这个也是需要注意的地方，有些企业是均衡在每季度记帐，有些企业在当期计算抵扣，有些企业在收到了退税以后一次性记帐，这个就需要认真判断的。还有就是折旧率变化引起的所得税变化，比如说华泰股份就是个极端的例子，他在缴纳所得税的折旧费是按照那个什么“加倍折旧法”（我忘记了具体的说法，请行家给我解释一下这个情况，谢谢！）来计算利润额的，但在公布的财务报告中是按照平常的折旧率计算的，所以他的所得税率就大大的低于正常情况下的缴纳所得额，但这个现在减少的所得税在以后还是需要拿出去的。
C，数据的连续性、稳定型及成长性，一个好公司在行业景气度平稳的情况下，应该保持其连续性、稳定型及成长性，假如某一数据发生异动，那么就得找原因，明白是为什么？尽可能的做到心中有数，假如一个公司经常的数据异动，那么就得怀疑公司报表的真实性及管理层的能力问题。有关数据的变化应该与行业景气度、产能的扩张情况吻合，否则就得找原因。
D，公司管理费用的异动，一般来说管理费用会慢慢的平稳的增长，假如一下子大幅度波动，那么就说明有问题，不是操纵利润就是管理上有问题，产能的扩张一般来说也不会大幅度增加管理费用的，当然，这里也有由于记帐科目的变化引起的。
E，应收帐款的异动，应收帐款的大幅度增加，一般来说说明销售方面产生问题，当然，也有可能是销售政策的变化，应注意财务报告的附注说明。说明有可能行业景气度产生变化，说明公司未来的成长性有问题，甚至是做假的可能。
F，库存情况的异动。一般来说就是说明公司销售有问题，也有可能是做假的需要，关心一下财务报告的附注说明，如果没有合理的说明，那么就应该警惕。
G，公司计划的完成情况，这个是属于考察管理层能力的方面。一般来说，公司的预测计划都是相对谨慎的，不会信口开河。也就是说，一个好公司应该是一年的经营情况好于年初的计划预测，如果不能完成计划，如果大幅度超过计划，都不是好的现象，最起码说明你管理层没能力对于市场进行预测，特别是对于生产量预测的大幅度偏离。作为一个大公司的管理层，不能相对准确的预测市场以及不能掌握自己的生产量都是无能的体现。如此，你如何应对千变万化的市场？你如何面对生产管理？你如何进行公司的远期规划？所以，我对于钢铁业中的武钢、太钢的管理层投了不信任票。
财务陷阱初探
财务报表是基本面分析的重要工具，同时财务报表存在着众多的陷阱。财务数据造假与合法的财务调整都能误导投资者，我们不能指望所有上市公司的管理层都能遵纪守法如实地反映企业的经营情况。要避开财务陷阱，就要对上市公司玩弄的财技有所了解，找出需要关注的重点。
正常情况下，经营性现金流应随净利润增加同步增长。如果经营性现金流增长持续落后于净利润增长，则需要小心。造成这种情况的原因很多，如企业为获得更多的业务而放松信贷条件，业务扩张过快存货激增等。这些都可能会给企业经营带来潜在的风险。对于自由现金流差的情况，具有反身性特点的公司比较特别。这类公司资金需求度很强，一般属于轻资产型公司，高速扩张的过程中，利润几乎全部被转化为再投资，自由现金流数据不会很优秀。与重资产公司不同，轻资产型企业再投资用于快速复制盈利单位，融资过程中保持很高的资本回报率，也就是再投入资本不断为股东创造更高的价值。重资产型公司则通常资金利用效率低下，再投资资本回报率比资本成本还低，长期而言资本支出侵蚀企业价值。
非经常性损益包括股权转让、股票投资收益、公司重组费用等一次性损益。非经常性损益可以突发性增减盈利，一般不会影响公司的长期发展，分析净利润数据时应剔除这部分收益。值得注意的是，企业可以把经营活动中发生的费用隐藏在非经常性损益中，而且允许存在较大误差，掩盖经营过程中的问题。投资者应该把这些费用拆分并分析是否真正是非经营性的，若其中隐含了经营性费用则要评估对企业长期发展的影响。
资产周转率对资产收益率有重要影响，资产周转率降低可能就意味着资产收益率降低。存货也是重点考察对象，存货激增可能是企业对销售过于乐观，也可能是产品滞销。
若应收帐款比营业收入增长快，说明公司的信用条款比较宽松，越来越多的帐款被作为赊销，借出去的现金不一定能全部和及时收回，隐含损失部分现金和不能及时收回而影响正常运作的风险。应收帐款占比过高也面临同样的风险。坏帐准备是反映企业预期有多少帐款会被赖帐而设定的损失准备，一定程度可以反映部分赊账回收情况。另外值得关注的还有其它应收款，很多企业什么东西都往里装。许多无法入帐的东西都放在这个科目里。如被占用的上市公司资金经常挂在其它应收款下，形成难以收回的资产。另外净利润增长率数年持续超过主营收入增长率也是值得关注的现象，需要探究其盈利增长真正的动力何在。
各种费用的计提、坏帐准备和折旧是调节净利润的重要手段。坏帐准备与应收帐款有一定关联性，若应收帐款大幅增加而坏帐准备没有相应提高，说明企业对应收帐款的回收过于乐观，会形成一定的风险。若坏帐准备突然大幅度增加，要么是有意隐瞒利润，要么应收帐款回收出现大问题。调节费用计提和折旧摊销同样能轻易调节净利润，如增加折旧年限、把费用性支出作为资本支出进行摊销、刻意减少存货跌价准备、先大幅计提再释放利润等。这些数据出现异常就要找出真正的原因。
无形资产是指企业长期使用而没有实物形态的资产，包括专利权、非专利技术、商标权、著作权、土地使用权、商誉等，其中商誉的弹性最大。超过企业账面价值的那部分就是商誉，合并商誉等于购入成本与标的净资产公允价值之差。商誉的可调节范围很大且难于评估，因此企业操纵商誉的自由度很大。
股权投资和债券投资反映在资产负债表上的价值可能与其实际价值有较大差异。若投资占总资产比例很高时，我们就要注意弄清楚它的实际价值，股权投资的风险更大。
上市公司与母公司控制的其它子公司之间，可能存在错综复杂的关联关系与交易。关联企业之间进行非实质性交易，构造循环陷阱，实现操纵收入和提升利润，也存在利益输送、大股东掏空上市公司的可能。上市公司与其大股东之间还可以通过往来资金（其它应收款、其它应付款）来改善原本难看的经营性现金流。本来关联企业的往来资金往往带有融资性质，但是借款方并不作为短期借款或者长期借款，而是放在其它应付款中核算，作为贷款方不作为债权，而是在其它应收款中核算，这样经营性现金流量净额就可能被夸大。
不同行业的企业有不同的收入确认原则和时间，通过收入确认的时间差和灵活运用确认原则，可以把利润在不同的财政年度中来回捣腾。一些财务数据的伪装需要很长时间才能慢慢显现出来，投资者要对数年的财务报表综合分析研究才能发现其中的猫腻。
担保是一个可能带来致命性结果的大陷阱。若担保的金额较大，被担保公司赖帐或没有偿还能力，则可能带来灭顶之灾。
财务陷阱真可谓是纷繁复杂，令人防不胜防。以上提到也许只是冰山一角，欢迎各位朋友特别是专业人士深入探讨和补充。
对几个最重要的财务指标的理解
净资产收益率
净资产收益率是净资产创造价值能力的体现，也是能真正如实反映企业经营情况的指标。投资的本质就是赚钱，投入多少钱，每年能赚多少，是最直观的。所以净资产收益率是反映企业盈利能力最重要的指标。另外，高净资产收益率表明企业具备获取超额利润的能力，这种情况如果能持续，说明企业拥有一定的壁垒，ROE越高表明壁垒越强大，未来持续获得超额利润的可能性也越大。无论什么行业，ROE的标准都应该是统一的。若行业整体ROE都低，则表明这个行业不值得投资。
净利润增长率
净利润增长率是反映企业成长性的重要指标之一。但高净利润增长率并不代表股东一定能获得高回报，具体情况具体分析。如果成长要依靠不断融资才能实现，而ROE不能保持或同步提高，则表明股权的稀释降低了成长为股东创造的价值，投资者未必能获得高回报。另外要考察成长的质量高不高，是否能持续等。所以净利润增长率并不能很直观地反映企业真实本质的情况，要结合其他基本面才能较好地进行判断。否则很容易掉进高增长陷阱。
毛利率
毛利率是考察企业盈利能力的一个重要的指标，不同行业毛利率差别较大，当然越高越好，象茅台这样毛利率高达50％以上的企业，很可能就是好的投资标的。由于净利率可以通过费用控制或其他手段进行调整，不能直观地反映企业产品的竞争力，而毛利率避免了这些影响，能直接反映企业的盈利能力和竞争力，高毛利率通常是拥有壁垒的特征之一。高毛利率不代表高的净利率，如果企业费用控制不当或者行业的特殊性会造成高毛利率低净利率的现象。如服务性行业一般毛利率都较高，但具体企业净利率却千差万别，这与企业的经营效率和费用控制能力有较大的相关性。
净利率
净利率比较综合地反应企业盈利能力，是影响企业实际营运绩效的主要指标。通常净利率越高越好，但不同行业净利率应有不同的标准。有些行业净利率很低，但资产周转率高、营业收入高，则一样很有投资价值，家电连锁业就是典型代表。
负债率
负债率过高意味着高风险，企业的负债支付的能力很重要，一旦周转出现问题，可能牵涉到企业的存亡。有时高负债率不一定代表高风险，深入分析才能得出正确的结论。例如若应付帐款很高造成的高负债率有时还是好现象，表明企业可能对供应商处于强势地位，当然这个也要具体问题具体分析。
Monday, June 7, 2010
2010年6月8日祖師爺的方法還行得通嗎?
2010年6月8日
信報研究部
祖師爺的方法還行得通嗎?
門下財經猛人輩出的Benjamin Graham在美蘇兩大陣營冷戰方殷、環球局勢在核戰危機陰影下的1963年親自講解其投資方法；而在經濟不安全（美國的債務問題與歐豬五國只是五十步笑百步，股神畢非德上周警告美國部分地方政府債券市場可能爆破；世銀行長則指中國和印度面臨一定程度的經濟過熱風險）的今天，Graham的方法仍有不可忽視的價值。
Benjamin Graham（1894-1976）和David Dodd在1934年合著的《證券分析》Security Analysis為他奠定了「證券分析之父」的美譽，他1949年撰寫的《聰明的投資者》The Intelligent Investor更被喻為投資的聖經。1928年，Graham回母校哥倫比亞大學任教，他的學生包括後來赫赫有名的股神畢非德（Warren Buffet）、互惠基金經理John Neff和著名投資顧問Irving Kahn等等，他們不但將Graham的價值投資法為圭臬，畢非德和Kahn更為其子取名Howard Graham Buffett和Thomas Graham Kahn。Graham並不是只會紙上談兵，他與Jerome Newman合夥的投資公司經歷了1929年華爾街大崩潰的洗禮，其後直到1956年Graham退休，公司平均每年回報達17%。
1960年代是國際政局風起雲湧的年代：1962年10月，古巴導彈危機幾乎引致處於冷戰的美國和蘇聯爆發熱戰；1963年11月2日，中南半島戰火燎天，南越總統吳庭艷在據稱是美國中情局策劃的政變被殺；同年11月22日發生一件震動世界的大事，美國總統甘迺迪遇刺。而美國、英國和蘇聯雖然1963年8月簽署禁止核試條約，但在美國和蘇聯都有毀滅性數量的核武威脅下，全球無法擺脫「恐怖平衡」的心理陰影。11月15日，Graham應邀發表「在不安全的世界保平安」（Security In An Insecure World）的演說，他一開口即表明除了金融安全之外，其他有關人身安全、心理安全以至婚姻安全等等由於所知不多，他決定一概不置一辭，即使金融方面，他也只會談及最熟悉的股票和債券投資。他並幽默地把講題改動一字，語帶相關的將題目變為Securities In An Insecure World。
在1960年代，股票由於買賣方便，資金需求又遠低於房屋或藝術品，可算得是最理想的投資項目。至於在不安全的環境裏，Graham就當時局勢指出三類投資股票的威脅或危險（threat or danger），首先是爆發核戰，但這是一旦發生則任何人也無力回天的悲劇，因此唯有視而不見把問題掃到地毯下面。
通脹概念倒果為因
第二類威脅是通脹，Graham表示，很多醒目投資者都明白，投資組合必需包括一定數量的普通股（common stocks，相對於優先股preferred stocks）對沖通脹風險。但他發現投資者其實倒果為因，受到價格上升的吸引買進股票多於為了對沖通脹，證據是第二次世界大戰（1937-1945）結束後的1945-1949年間，通脹（消費者物價指數）爆炸式上升33%，道指1949年收市卻稍低於1945年的高位【圖1】；反而1958-1963年通脹只得6.5%，道指在這段期間升幅達100%【圖2】，這反映了投資者在升市時通脹不離口，在上落市的日子則完全沒有想過投資股票預防通脹。
放大圖片
放大圖片
第三類威脅是投資者及投機者（Graham表示稍後將談及兩者的分別）感到最切身的股價或市況大幅升跌。股市波動原是常態，問題是投資者情緒若完全被市況牽動，在大市過分熱炒時搶購估值偏高的股份，在大市下跌時卻不敢買入估值偏低的優質股，典型例子有IBM由1961年12月被投機炒上607，1962年6月沽低至300；老牌優質股通用電氣（General Electric）由1960年的100跌至1962年的54。又例如1962年道指由年初的735點跌到5月的535點，大部分之前兩年上市的新股更由投機炒作推上的高位狂瀉50-90%，當其時沒有人會認為大市將進入上升的單程路；相反，當1963年的道指突破1962年5月谷底抽上的高位，大多數財經界人士又轉而一致看升。
跑贏大市並非易事
Graham指很多投資者對股市有兩個錯誤的概念，有人認為股市長線必然上升，即使短期大幅向下調整也不用擔心；有人認為根本毋須理會股市指數，優質股永遠上升而圾垃股則長期向下，只要買入良好的股票便可以高枕無憂。前者所持的理據是戰後14年（1949-1963）道指由163點反覆升至750點，因此30隻道指成分股未來同樣有好表現是合理預期，但Graham指出，道指由1949-50年偏低的7倍P/E升至偏高的20倍P/E，期望大市往後14年會重複1949-63年的平均每年14%回報無論如何也是過分樂觀，而且經驗顯示，股市大升之後通常都會大幅度調整；至於個別股份急升至高位仍然讓人憧憬股價有力更上一層樓，唯一理由是「外在」（external）因素的支持，並不是股價可以只升不跌。Graham表示，其實最早可追溯到1720年的南海泡沫，股市的本質一點也沒有改變，投資者不是過度樂觀就是過度悲觀【表】，無論投資或投機都要有股市隨時會大升大跌的心理準備。
Graham又忠告投資者，不要高估自己的揀股眼光，即使擁有全國最頂尖金融專才的投資基金公司，投入巨大的人力和財力，記錄顯示總體回報仍落後於道指和涵蓋500隻股票、多年來與道指同步升跌的標普500指數【圖3】；而投資者和投機者整體來說屬於大市一部分，期望表現好過大市即是自己打贏自己，邏輯上說不通。另外，Graham研究發現，當某種預測技術普及化之後，便會莫名其妙地消失效能，他曾經利用著名的道氏理論（Dow Theory）做實驗統計，在1898-1933年大約35年期間的成績十分理想，但1933年道氏理論成為「通識」其後的25年，每次跟隨訊號沽貨之後從未試過在較低價位買回。
然而，Graham表示，以他在華爾街打滾55年的觀察心得，要跑贏大市首先是選擇股票應注重其實質價值，不要被大市波動而影響對該股的評價，他建議挑選20至30隻有代表性及行業的龍頭股，有些股價並不包涵商譽（goodwill）或低賬面值的股票最抵買，直至1957年有不少定價「殷實」的股票上市，其股價到後來業務擴展分拆上市一直有好表現；至於有機會重組、收購、合併等等的股票也是買入對象，雖然這是十分專業範圍，但精明的投資者不難從平時多留心公司的商業動態找到蛛絲馬跡。另外，在這個「不安全的世界」有需要分散投資，Graham提議25-75%資金比例投資於普通股和債券（包括有利息收入的產品，例如存款），在估值偏高時最少持有25%股票，其餘75%投資債券，到估值偏低時增持股票至75%，因應市況靈活調校持股比例。
最後，Graham講述華爾街一個古老故事，有一位客戶向他的經紀請教買什麼股票，經紀反問說：你想要食得好還是睡得好？正如Graham在The Security Analysis指出，經過周密分析，本金及回報有保障就是投資，反之便是投機（An investment operation is one which, upon thorough analysis, promises safety of principal and an adequate return. Operations not meeting these requirements are speculative）。因此，Graham相信，任何投資者只要遵循良好的投資策略，不但可以食得好同時夜晚有覺好瞓。 策劃 信報研究部
信報研究部
祖師爺的方法還行得通嗎?
門下財經猛人輩出的Benjamin Graham在美蘇兩大陣營冷戰方殷、環球局勢在核戰危機陰影下的1963年親自講解其投資方法；而在經濟不安全（美國的債務問題與歐豬五國只是五十步笑百步，股神畢非德上周警告美國部分地方政府債券市場可能爆破；世銀行長則指中國和印度面臨一定程度的經濟過熱風險）的今天，Graham的方法仍有不可忽視的價值。
Benjamin Graham（1894-1976）和David Dodd在1934年合著的《證券分析》Security Analysis為他奠定了「證券分析之父」的美譽，他1949年撰寫的《聰明的投資者》The Intelligent Investor更被喻為投資的聖經。1928年，Graham回母校哥倫比亞大學任教，他的學生包括後來赫赫有名的股神畢非德（Warren Buffet）、互惠基金經理John Neff和著名投資顧問Irving Kahn等等，他們不但將Graham的價值投資法為圭臬，畢非德和Kahn更為其子取名Howard Graham Buffett和Thomas Graham Kahn。Graham並不是只會紙上談兵，他與Jerome Newman合夥的投資公司經歷了1929年華爾街大崩潰的洗禮，其後直到1956年Graham退休，公司平均每年回報達17%。
1960年代是國際政局風起雲湧的年代：1962年10月，古巴導彈危機幾乎引致處於冷戰的美國和蘇聯爆發熱戰；1963年11月2日，中南半島戰火燎天，南越總統吳庭艷在據稱是美國中情局策劃的政變被殺；同年11月22日發生一件震動世界的大事，美國總統甘迺迪遇刺。而美國、英國和蘇聯雖然1963年8月簽署禁止核試條約，但在美國和蘇聯都有毀滅性數量的核武威脅下，全球無法擺脫「恐怖平衡」的心理陰影。11月15日，Graham應邀發表「在不安全的世界保平安」（Security In An Insecure World）的演說，他一開口即表明除了金融安全之外，其他有關人身安全、心理安全以至婚姻安全等等由於所知不多，他決定一概不置一辭，即使金融方面，他也只會談及最熟悉的股票和債券投資。他並幽默地把講題改動一字，語帶相關的將題目變為Securities In An Insecure World。
在1960年代，股票由於買賣方便，資金需求又遠低於房屋或藝術品，可算得是最理想的投資項目。至於在不安全的環境裏，Graham就當時局勢指出三類投資股票的威脅或危險（threat or danger），首先是爆發核戰，但這是一旦發生則任何人也無力回天的悲劇，因此唯有視而不見把問題掃到地毯下面。
通脹概念倒果為因
第二類威脅是通脹，Graham表示，很多醒目投資者都明白，投資組合必需包括一定數量的普通股（common stocks，相對於優先股preferred stocks）對沖通脹風險。但他發現投資者其實倒果為因，受到價格上升的吸引買進股票多於為了對沖通脹，證據是第二次世界大戰（1937-1945）結束後的1945-1949年間，通脹（消費者物價指數）爆炸式上升33%，道指1949年收市卻稍低於1945年的高位【圖1】；反而1958-1963年通脹只得6.5%，道指在這段期間升幅達100%【圖2】，這反映了投資者在升市時通脹不離口，在上落市的日子則完全沒有想過投資股票預防通脹。
放大圖片
放大圖片
第三類威脅是投資者及投機者（Graham表示稍後將談及兩者的分別）感到最切身的股價或市況大幅升跌。股市波動原是常態，問題是投資者情緒若完全被市況牽動，在大市過分熱炒時搶購估值偏高的股份，在大市下跌時卻不敢買入估值偏低的優質股，典型例子有IBM由1961年12月被投機炒上607，1962年6月沽低至300；老牌優質股通用電氣（General Electric）由1960年的100跌至1962年的54。又例如1962年道指由年初的735點跌到5月的535點，大部分之前兩年上市的新股更由投機炒作推上的高位狂瀉50-90%，當其時沒有人會認為大市將進入上升的單程路；相反，當1963年的道指突破1962年5月谷底抽上的高位，大多數財經界人士又轉而一致看升。
跑贏大市並非易事
Graham指很多投資者對股市有兩個錯誤的概念，有人認為股市長線必然上升，即使短期大幅向下調整也不用擔心；有人認為根本毋須理會股市指數，優質股永遠上升而圾垃股則長期向下，只要買入良好的股票便可以高枕無憂。前者所持的理據是戰後14年（1949-1963）道指由163點反覆升至750點，因此30隻道指成分股未來同樣有好表現是合理預期，但Graham指出，道指由1949-50年偏低的7倍P/E升至偏高的20倍P/E，期望大市往後14年會重複1949-63年的平均每年14%回報無論如何也是過分樂觀，而且經驗顯示，股市大升之後通常都會大幅度調整；至於個別股份急升至高位仍然讓人憧憬股價有力更上一層樓，唯一理由是「外在」（external）因素的支持，並不是股價可以只升不跌。Graham表示，其實最早可追溯到1720年的南海泡沫，股市的本質一點也沒有改變，投資者不是過度樂觀就是過度悲觀【表】，無論投資或投機都要有股市隨時會大升大跌的心理準備。
Graham又忠告投資者，不要高估自己的揀股眼光，即使擁有全國最頂尖金融專才的投資基金公司，投入巨大的人力和財力，記錄顯示總體回報仍落後於道指和涵蓋500隻股票、多年來與道指同步升跌的標普500指數【圖3】；而投資者和投機者整體來說屬於大市一部分，期望表現好過大市即是自己打贏自己，邏輯上說不通。另外，Graham研究發現，當某種預測技術普及化之後，便會莫名其妙地消失效能，他曾經利用著名的道氏理論（Dow Theory）做實驗統計，在1898-1933年大約35年期間的成績十分理想，但1933年道氏理論成為「通識」其後的25年，每次跟隨訊號沽貨之後從未試過在較低價位買回。
然而，Graham表示，以他在華爾街打滾55年的觀察心得，要跑贏大市首先是選擇股票應注重其實質價值，不要被大市波動而影響對該股的評價，他建議挑選20至30隻有代表性及行業的龍頭股，有些股價並不包涵商譽（goodwill）或低賬面值的股票最抵買，直至1957年有不少定價「殷實」的股票上市，其股價到後來業務擴展分拆上市一直有好表現；至於有機會重組、收購、合併等等的股票也是買入對象，雖然這是十分專業範圍，但精明的投資者不難從平時多留心公司的商業動態找到蛛絲馬跡。另外，在這個「不安全的世界」有需要分散投資，Graham提議25-75%資金比例投資於普通股和債券（包括有利息收入的產品，例如存款），在估值偏高時最少持有25%股票，其餘75%投資債券，到估值偏低時增持股票至75%，因應市況靈活調校持股比例。
最後，Graham講述華爾街一個古老故事，有一位客戶向他的經紀請教買什麼股票，經紀反問說：你想要食得好還是睡得好？正如Graham在The Security Analysis指出，經過周密分析，本金及回報有保障就是投資，反之便是投機（An investment operation is one which, upon thorough analysis, promises safety of principal and an adequate return. Operations not meeting these requirements are speculative）。因此，Graham相信，任何投資者只要遵循良好的投資策略，不但可以食得好同時夜晚有覺好瞓。 策劃 信報研究部
Wednesday, May 26, 2010
Investing in a low-return world
Summary: Total returns from the US stock market over the next decade could be significantly lower than the last one, but investing in gold, commodities and real estate may not be a solution.
John Bogle, the founder of Vanguard Funds, gave a seminal speech in June 2003 in which he laid down a framework for estimating future long-term returns from the stock market. Stock market returns over the next ten years, he argued, will be determined by three elements:
- By how much will earnings grow between now and then?
- What value will the market place on those earnings a decade from now?
- How much will an investor receive in dividends along the way?
Bogle called these factors investment return and speculative return. Dividend payments and companies' earnings are investment returns. Changes in the value the market places on earnings - the market's P/E ratio - are speculative returns. Bogle argued that for a rough estimate of future market returns, you can simply add the three numbers together. (You should really multiply earnings growth by the change in P/E, but there's not much difference in practice.) The dividend yield plus earnings growth plus the change in the market's P/E ratio will give you total future returns.
Bogle showed that the US stock market returned an average of 10.4% annually in each decade between 1900 and 2000, of which 9.8 percentage points came from earnings growth and dividends, and 0.6 percentage points from an increase in the market's P/E ratio.
Speculative returns fluctuate far more than investment returns, though. The poor performance of the 70s, when total annual returns were just 5.9%, was driven by a collapse of the market's P/E ratio that sliced 7.5% off returns each year. The bull market of the 80s and 90s, when total annual returns were 17.3% and 17.8% respectively, was driven by a dramatic rise in the market's P/E ratio that added 7.7% annually to returns in the 80s and 7.2% in the 90s.
At the time he gave his speech in 2003, Bogle predicted that the stock market would return only 7.5% over the next decade. Earnings would grow by about 6%, dividends would add 2%, and the market's P/E ratio would contract slightly. Bogle argued that the market's P/E ratio tends to revert to its historical mean level, which is about 15.5 since 1935. You can read Bogle's speech here; I've also put some links to some of his books on the right hand side of this page, which are excellent for investment professionals and retail investors alike.
When Bogle gave his speech in June 2003, the S&P 500 was trading at about 19 times operating earnings (its multiple of reported earnings would have been higher). Nine months later, in March 2004, the S&P 500 was trading at about 18 times 2004 estimated operating earnings, 22 times reported earnings, and 23 times "core" earnings, a new measure that Standard & Poor believes is a more accurate measure of corporate profits.
Can we then expect total stock market returns for the next decade to be about 7.5%? Not according to John Mauldin.
John Mauldin's new book, Bull's Eye Investing - Targeting Real Returns in a Smoke and Mirrors Market, asks where the stock market will be in ten years' time, and how you should invest as a result of that. It's potentially important, not so much because Mauldin disagrees with Bogle's estimate of future returns, but because his investment recommendations are so different. (You can find a link to the book on the right of this page.)
In the first half of the book, Mauldin sets out to prove that in ten years' time the US stock market will likely be no higher than it is now, and possibly significantly lower. (Mauldin's book follows a recent spate of books that predict impending financial declines for the US, the most prominent of which I've also linked to on the right of this page.) Like Bogle, Mauldin uses the framework of estimating dividends and earnings growth - Bogle's investment return - and the value the market will place on those future earnings - Bogle's speculative return. But he differs sharply with Bogle because he thinks the market's P/E ratio will contract, and earnings growth will be below its historical average.
First, on the market's P/E. Mauldin thinks that the market's P/E ratio will fall over the next decade for four reasons:
Secular bull markets have never started from times when the market's P/E ratio was as high as it is today.
The market is currently overvalued compared to its historical average using multiple measures, and will likely revert to its mean valuation. (This is also the current view of money manager Jeremy Granthan, whose excellent quarterly letters and asset class forecasts you can access via the link on The Market Resource Page.)
The risk premium is currently too low, given recent corporate scandals and geopolitical risk. The risk premium is the return investors expect from risky assets (stocks) over and above the return on assets which bear no principal risk (US Treasury bills). A rise in the risk premium would mean that investors would have to expect higher returns in the future, which means present values would have to fall. In other words, the market's P/E ratio would have to fall.
In the past, the market's P/E ratio has fallen when inflation has risen. The market's P/E ratio also falls when an economy slips into deflation. Given the US economy's current inflation rate (close to zero), there's therefore nowhere to go that would result in a higher P/E ratio for the market.
Next, Mauldin provides four reasons why corporate earnings will grow more slowly than their historical rate of 5.7% to 6%:
Companies' future reported earnings will be depressed by the adoption of stricter accounting standards, the expensing of options, and higher pension costs.
The retirement of the baby-boomers in the US and the aging of the populations of Europe, China and the ex-Soviet bloc will depress demand for products and services. It will also dramatically raise government spending on health care and pensions and thereby push up tax rates, further hampering economic growth.
The US budget deficit and current account deficit will lead to a 30% to 40% decline in the dollar and weak economic growth.
Innovation works in cycles, resulting in periods of fast growth followed by overinvestmend and slower growth. Mauldin thinks these cycles last about 55 years, and we're entering the slow phase now.
In sum, expect P/E ratios to fall and earnings growth to disappoint. Add in dividend yields far below their historic average, and total market returns for the next decade look bad.
How bad, exactly? Well, Mauldin suggests that P/E ratios could fall from their current average (18-23, depending on how you calculate earnings) to below 10. Somewhat offset by mediocre earnings growth and 2% dividends annually, Mauldin thinks that net returns for the broad stock market over the next decade will probably be zero to slightly negative. Mauldin's estimate is similar to Jeremy Grantham's most current seven year forecast of minus two percent annualized returns from US large cap and small cap stocks, but a lot worse than Bogle's June 2003 estimate of 7.5% annual returns.
In some places in his book, Mauldin suggests that total returns will be far worse. He refers to "the long term secular bear market with the slow economic growth I predict for the rest of the decade", and predicts that the Nasdaq, with its inflated valuations and lack of dividends, will plummet, ending up lower than the S&P 500. That's quite a fall, given that at the time I write this the S&P 500 is at about 1,100 and the Nasdaq's at 1,925.
Given this depressing prognosis, how does Mauldin think you should invest for the next decade?
With total returns from the US stock market expected to be zero or negative over the next decade, what's an investor to do? Mauldin makes the following suggestions:
Buy value stocks. "Buying deep value for the long term is a strategy that works in all types of markets", Mauldin says. Value stocks have histically outperformed growth stocks, so you should buy stocks when their price is below the present value of their future earnings. If you can't pick value stocks (or, I should add, calculate present-discounted-values...) then buy equity mutual funds run by value-oriented managers. Mauldin recommends that you buy stocks with low P/E ratios, and wait until the market's overall P/E is below 10-12 to buy index funds. (His approach sometimes mirrors and sometimes differs from other advocates of value-stock investing. I've linked to some of the best books on the topic on the right.)
Buy dividend yielding stocks, because "a stock with a 6 percent dividend rate will roughly double your portfolio every 14 years after taxes, even if there is no growth in the stock or growth in the dividend".
Buy only short term bonds, since interest rates are heading up. If you can, choose foreign bonds, since the dollar will fall by another 30-40%. Buy the bonds directly and hold them to maturity in a laddered bond portfolio. Don't buy bond funds, because you'll take a hit to your principle as rates rise.
Buy gold, because "the general direction of the price of gold is up, and will be so until the dollar stabilizes". Even better, buy gold stocks since they are leveraged to the price of gold, but make sure you know which companies' stocks to pick.
Invest in commodities, through commodity pools and global macro funds. Like gold, commodity prices should benefit from the falling dollar.
Buy real estate by borrowing money while interest rates are low, and servicing the debt by renting out the property. "Inflation will eventually be your friend", by pushing up the value of your property while reducing the real value of your debt.
Do Mauldin's investment recommendations make sense?
John Mauldin's recommendation to buy stocks, gold and real estate, and to own only short-term bonds is based on a strong assumption: that the primary risk over the next decade is inflation.
When prices are rising, investors want to own real assets and borrow nominal assets. If you own property, its price should rise with inflation. If you own stocks, corporate earnings should increase as companies raise the prices they charge. And because the US dollar becomes less valuable as prices rise, gold should do well. In an inflationary environment, bonds do badly: their principal value is eroded over time, and their interest payments decrease in real terms as prices rise. For exactly that reason, it makes sense to borrow money when inflation is rising: the amount you'll have to repay in real terms will be less than when you took the loan. That's why Mauldin thinks that borrowing money - a nominal asset - to purchase property - a real asset - makes sense for the next decade.
But what if deflation takes hold and prices actually fall? Then all of this is reversed. If you hold cash in a money market account, it gets more valuable by the day. But the prices of gold and property decline, and corporate earnings fall as companies charge lower prices for their goods and services. In a deflationary environment you want to own nominal assets and avoid real assets. The home-run investment before deflation sets in is long-term bonds, because the principal becomes more valuable as prices fall, while interest payments are higher than from short-term bonds. The worst investment in a deflationary environment would be to borrow money to buy property. Deflation would boost the value of the debt (the nominal asset) and slice the nominal value of the property (the real asset), so you'd lose on both ends of the trade.
So a lot hinges on Mauldin's assumption that inflation is more likely than deflation over the next decade. Is that assumption correct? That's far from clear. It seems to me that the outlook for the US economy over the next decade - whether it will face inflation, deflation or price stability - will be determined by five factors:
The twin deficits. The federal bugdet deficit and the US current account deficit are both potentially inflationary. The current account deficit could lead to a declining dollar, which would raise import prices. And when governments face large and intractable budget deficits, one "solution" is to inflate away the value of the government's outstanding debt.
Accelerating economic growth due to liberalization of markets. China, India and the ex-Soviet bloc are rapidly liberalizing their economies. That should boost economic growth in those countries and the countries they trade with. Rising demand from those countries should push up the price of oil and commodities, and potentially boost demand for US products. Impact? Inflationary in the short run. But what about the long run? If energy and commodity prices are pushed up by rising demand from China and other developing countries, the impact on US aggregate demand will be negative. (Rising prices due to external forces are equivalent to a tax on an economy.) Will overall prices in the US rise in line with commodity prices, or will the negative economic impact lead to falling prices and lower margins? Not clear.
Increasing global competition. The opening of the low-cost labor markets of China, India and Eastern Europe has occurred at the same time that improvements in communications and global supply chain management have made outsourcing easier than ever. This should push down the price of labor (which accounts for the majority of production costs) in developed countries. Unless Western countries quickly retrain and re-educate their workforces, the period of structural change could be highly deflationary.
The aging of the US, European and Russian populations. More on that in a moment.
Monetary and fiscal policy. Deflation could inflict serious damage on the US economy due to high household and corporate debt relative to historical levels. Fed governors have stated that they will do everything they can to prevent deflation.
How will these factors play out? Not clear. The forces of inflation versus deflation and the impact of globalization within that have been the subject of intense debate. As the cyclical upswing in the US economy takes hold and the employment data improve, the short-term risk of deflation seems to be receding. But the deflationary forces of globalization and aging are secular, not cyclical, and won't disappear due to a recovery in the US economy. Demography is particularly important, so we'll look at that in more detail now.
The problem of global aging is particularly important for investors, and is becoming more urgent. In 2006, the first of the American "baby-boomers", born in 1946, will reach their 60th birthdays, the earliest legal retirement age. Then, in 2011, they'll be eligable for full retirement benefits.
The impending increase in government benefits payments caused by the retirement of the baby-boomers is occuring at the same time the US is running an unprecendented budget deficit. Think-tanks and policy makers have therefore begun to ask some tough questions:
What will be the impact on the federal budget deficit of the increase in social security and medicare payments?
Will tax rates have to rise to pay for these benefits?
Will a balooning budget deficit push up long-term interest rates?
Can retirees rest assured that their benefits won't be cut?
Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan has raised the public policy issues in speeches and testimony to Congress with increasing frequency lately. He's expressed concern about the budget deficit, but has avoided calling for tax increases or even a reversal of recent tax cuts. Instead, he advocates reducing future benefit payments, partly through the adoption of a new way to calculate the price index that would cut the future value of index-linked benefits.
The result of this debate has been that much of the discussion about global aging has focused on benefit payments, taxes and the budget deficit, and how these factors will impact retirees and workers over future decades. Because rising deficits have historically led to inflation, viewing the global aging issue primarily from the tax and budget deficit perspective has led people to the conclusion that global aging is an inflation problem.
Laurence Kotlikoff and Scott Burns in their book The Coming Generational Storm, for example, paint a picture of aging global populations and then write that:
"The United States is doing all the things that mark an economy soon to be wracked by inflation and a weak currency."
And of course, they specifically mention the large and growing budget deficit. It won't surprise you to hear that Kotlikoff & Burns therefore provide the following investment recommendations:
Buy gold.
Buy real estate.
Buy inflation-protected government bonds (TIPs).
But the assumption that global aging will result in inflation - even given the growing budget deficit - is questionable. First, as Alan Greenspan realizes, most goverment obligations to retirees are index-linked, even if most current government debt is non-index linked. If governments print money to fund their deficits, their future obligations won't go away. Second, the retirement of the baby-boomers could have a strongly deflationary effect.
In Global Aging and Financial Markets, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, author Robert England discusses the possibility that as retirees withdraw money from their savings and pension fund outflows exceed inflows, the resulting sales of equities will massively depress stock prices. Others have discussed the possibility that house prices could decline as retirees move into smaller houses after their children leave home and they reduce their living expenses. And in countries that face population declines, such as Japan, Italy, Germany and Spain, demand for housing will fall.
In two other books, The Great Boom Ahead by Harry Dent and a rather sensationalist short follow-up by Daniel Arnold called The Great Bust Ahead, the authors argue that a reduction in the number of 45 to 55 year olds over the next decade will depress aggregate spending in the US.
These effects - falling equity prices, potentially falling house prices and reduced aggregate demand - are strongly deflationary. Yet Mauldin accepts Kotlikoff & Burn's assertion that population aging will lead to inflation, and adopts their recommendations to buy gold and real estate. Even Jonathan Clements, who writes an excellent personal finance column for the Wall Street Journal, repeated the recommendation to buy real estate by putting money into your own home, based on the assumption that inflation and taxes will both rise due to the aging problem.
Now, don't get me wrong: I'm not coming down on the side of deflation in this debate. However, adopting the assumption that the US faces rising inflation over the next decade without sufficient justification, and investing accordingly in property, gold and other real assets seems premature and risky.
Consider these points:
Japan has been hit by the population aging problem earlier than other countries, and has experienced deflation and significant declines in equity and property prices.
"Gold is a wonderful diversifier, but like any pure commodity that generates no economic return, and whose entire return is based on price speculation, it carries enormous risk". That's a quote from Jack Bogle.
House prices in the US and UK are at historical highs relative to incomes, and have been rising at a rapid rate due to low interest rate mortgage financing. As interest rates rise - particularly if real interest rates are driven up by government borrowing - property prices could take a hit. If they return to historical multiples of average incomes, the decline could be dramatic.
So I think we should approach Mauldin's recommendation to buy value stocks, gold and real estate with caution. If inflation rules, he'll be right. But if deflation rules, these asset classes could prove to be money losers.
John Bogle, the founder of Vanguard Funds, gave a seminal speech in June 2003 in which he laid down a framework for estimating future long-term returns from the stock market. Stock market returns over the next ten years, he argued, will be determined by three elements:
- By how much will earnings grow between now and then?
- What value will the market place on those earnings a decade from now?
- How much will an investor receive in dividends along the way?
Bogle called these factors investment return and speculative return. Dividend payments and companies' earnings are investment returns. Changes in the value the market places on earnings - the market's P/E ratio - are speculative returns. Bogle argued that for a rough estimate of future market returns, you can simply add the three numbers together. (You should really multiply earnings growth by the change in P/E, but there's not much difference in practice.) The dividend yield plus earnings growth plus the change in the market's P/E ratio will give you total future returns.
Bogle showed that the US stock market returned an average of 10.4% annually in each decade between 1900 and 2000, of which 9.8 percentage points came from earnings growth and dividends, and 0.6 percentage points from an increase in the market's P/E ratio.
Speculative returns fluctuate far more than investment returns, though. The poor performance of the 70s, when total annual returns were just 5.9%, was driven by a collapse of the market's P/E ratio that sliced 7.5% off returns each year. The bull market of the 80s and 90s, when total annual returns were 17.3% and 17.8% respectively, was driven by a dramatic rise in the market's P/E ratio that added 7.7% annually to returns in the 80s and 7.2% in the 90s.
At the time he gave his speech in 2003, Bogle predicted that the stock market would return only 7.5% over the next decade. Earnings would grow by about 6%, dividends would add 2%, and the market's P/E ratio would contract slightly. Bogle argued that the market's P/E ratio tends to revert to its historical mean level, which is about 15.5 since 1935. You can read Bogle's speech here; I've also put some links to some of his books on the right hand side of this page, which are excellent for investment professionals and retail investors alike.
When Bogle gave his speech in June 2003, the S&P 500 was trading at about 19 times operating earnings (its multiple of reported earnings would have been higher). Nine months later, in March 2004, the S&P 500 was trading at about 18 times 2004 estimated operating earnings, 22 times reported earnings, and 23 times "core" earnings, a new measure that Standard & Poor believes is a more accurate measure of corporate profits.
Can we then expect total stock market returns for the next decade to be about 7.5%? Not according to John Mauldin.
John Mauldin's new book, Bull's Eye Investing - Targeting Real Returns in a Smoke and Mirrors Market, asks where the stock market will be in ten years' time, and how you should invest as a result of that. It's potentially important, not so much because Mauldin disagrees with Bogle's estimate of future returns, but because his investment recommendations are so different. (You can find a link to the book on the right of this page.)
In the first half of the book, Mauldin sets out to prove that in ten years' time the US stock market will likely be no higher than it is now, and possibly significantly lower. (Mauldin's book follows a recent spate of books that predict impending financial declines for the US, the most prominent of which I've also linked to on the right of this page.) Like Bogle, Mauldin uses the framework of estimating dividends and earnings growth - Bogle's investment return - and the value the market will place on those future earnings - Bogle's speculative return. But he differs sharply with Bogle because he thinks the market's P/E ratio will contract, and earnings growth will be below its historical average.
First, on the market's P/E. Mauldin thinks that the market's P/E ratio will fall over the next decade for four reasons:
Secular bull markets have never started from times when the market's P/E ratio was as high as it is today.
The market is currently overvalued compared to its historical average using multiple measures, and will likely revert to its mean valuation. (This is also the current view of money manager Jeremy Granthan, whose excellent quarterly letters and asset class forecasts you can access via the link on The Market Resource Page.)
The risk premium is currently too low, given recent corporate scandals and geopolitical risk. The risk premium is the return investors expect from risky assets (stocks) over and above the return on assets which bear no principal risk (US Treasury bills). A rise in the risk premium would mean that investors would have to expect higher returns in the future, which means present values would have to fall. In other words, the market's P/E ratio would have to fall.
In the past, the market's P/E ratio has fallen when inflation has risen. The market's P/E ratio also falls when an economy slips into deflation. Given the US economy's current inflation rate (close to zero), there's therefore nowhere to go that would result in a higher P/E ratio for the market.
Next, Mauldin provides four reasons why corporate earnings will grow more slowly than their historical rate of 5.7% to 6%:
Companies' future reported earnings will be depressed by the adoption of stricter accounting standards, the expensing of options, and higher pension costs.
The retirement of the baby-boomers in the US and the aging of the populations of Europe, China and the ex-Soviet bloc will depress demand for products and services. It will also dramatically raise government spending on health care and pensions and thereby push up tax rates, further hampering economic growth.
The US budget deficit and current account deficit will lead to a 30% to 40% decline in the dollar and weak economic growth.
Innovation works in cycles, resulting in periods of fast growth followed by overinvestmend and slower growth. Mauldin thinks these cycles last about 55 years, and we're entering the slow phase now.
In sum, expect P/E ratios to fall and earnings growth to disappoint. Add in dividend yields far below their historic average, and total market returns for the next decade look bad.
How bad, exactly? Well, Mauldin suggests that P/E ratios could fall from their current average (18-23, depending on how you calculate earnings) to below 10. Somewhat offset by mediocre earnings growth and 2% dividends annually, Mauldin thinks that net returns for the broad stock market over the next decade will probably be zero to slightly negative. Mauldin's estimate is similar to Jeremy Grantham's most current seven year forecast of minus two percent annualized returns from US large cap and small cap stocks, but a lot worse than Bogle's June 2003 estimate of 7.5% annual returns.
In some places in his book, Mauldin suggests that total returns will be far worse. He refers to "the long term secular bear market with the slow economic growth I predict for the rest of the decade", and predicts that the Nasdaq, with its inflated valuations and lack of dividends, will plummet, ending up lower than the S&P 500. That's quite a fall, given that at the time I write this the S&P 500 is at about 1,100 and the Nasdaq's at 1,925.
Given this depressing prognosis, how does Mauldin think you should invest for the next decade?
With total returns from the US stock market expected to be zero or negative over the next decade, what's an investor to do? Mauldin makes the following suggestions:
Buy value stocks. "Buying deep value for the long term is a strategy that works in all types of markets", Mauldin says. Value stocks have histically outperformed growth stocks, so you should buy stocks when their price is below the present value of their future earnings. If you can't pick value stocks (or, I should add, calculate present-discounted-values...) then buy equity mutual funds run by value-oriented managers. Mauldin recommends that you buy stocks with low P/E ratios, and wait until the market's overall P/E is below 10-12 to buy index funds. (His approach sometimes mirrors and sometimes differs from other advocates of value-stock investing. I've linked to some of the best books on the topic on the right.)
Buy dividend yielding stocks, because "a stock with a 6 percent dividend rate will roughly double your portfolio every 14 years after taxes, even if there is no growth in the stock or growth in the dividend".
Buy only short term bonds, since interest rates are heading up. If you can, choose foreign bonds, since the dollar will fall by another 30-40%. Buy the bonds directly and hold them to maturity in a laddered bond portfolio. Don't buy bond funds, because you'll take a hit to your principle as rates rise.
Buy gold, because "the general direction of the price of gold is up, and will be so until the dollar stabilizes". Even better, buy gold stocks since they are leveraged to the price of gold, but make sure you know which companies' stocks to pick.
Invest in commodities, through commodity pools and global macro funds. Like gold, commodity prices should benefit from the falling dollar.
Buy real estate by borrowing money while interest rates are low, and servicing the debt by renting out the property. "Inflation will eventually be your friend", by pushing up the value of your property while reducing the real value of your debt.
Do Mauldin's investment recommendations make sense?
John Mauldin's recommendation to buy stocks, gold and real estate, and to own only short-term bonds is based on a strong assumption: that the primary risk over the next decade is inflation.
When prices are rising, investors want to own real assets and borrow nominal assets. If you own property, its price should rise with inflation. If you own stocks, corporate earnings should increase as companies raise the prices they charge. And because the US dollar becomes less valuable as prices rise, gold should do well. In an inflationary environment, bonds do badly: their principal value is eroded over time, and their interest payments decrease in real terms as prices rise. For exactly that reason, it makes sense to borrow money when inflation is rising: the amount you'll have to repay in real terms will be less than when you took the loan. That's why Mauldin thinks that borrowing money - a nominal asset - to purchase property - a real asset - makes sense for the next decade.
But what if deflation takes hold and prices actually fall? Then all of this is reversed. If you hold cash in a money market account, it gets more valuable by the day. But the prices of gold and property decline, and corporate earnings fall as companies charge lower prices for their goods and services. In a deflationary environment you want to own nominal assets and avoid real assets. The home-run investment before deflation sets in is long-term bonds, because the principal becomes more valuable as prices fall, while interest payments are higher than from short-term bonds. The worst investment in a deflationary environment would be to borrow money to buy property. Deflation would boost the value of the debt (the nominal asset) and slice the nominal value of the property (the real asset), so you'd lose on both ends of the trade.
So a lot hinges on Mauldin's assumption that inflation is more likely than deflation over the next decade. Is that assumption correct? That's far from clear. It seems to me that the outlook for the US economy over the next decade - whether it will face inflation, deflation or price stability - will be determined by five factors:
The twin deficits. The federal bugdet deficit and the US current account deficit are both potentially inflationary. The current account deficit could lead to a declining dollar, which would raise import prices. And when governments face large and intractable budget deficits, one "solution" is to inflate away the value of the government's outstanding debt.
Accelerating economic growth due to liberalization of markets. China, India and the ex-Soviet bloc are rapidly liberalizing their economies. That should boost economic growth in those countries and the countries they trade with. Rising demand from those countries should push up the price of oil and commodities, and potentially boost demand for US products. Impact? Inflationary in the short run. But what about the long run? If energy and commodity prices are pushed up by rising demand from China and other developing countries, the impact on US aggregate demand will be negative. (Rising prices due to external forces are equivalent to a tax on an economy.) Will overall prices in the US rise in line with commodity prices, or will the negative economic impact lead to falling prices and lower margins? Not clear.
Increasing global competition. The opening of the low-cost labor markets of China, India and Eastern Europe has occurred at the same time that improvements in communications and global supply chain management have made outsourcing easier than ever. This should push down the price of labor (which accounts for the majority of production costs) in developed countries. Unless Western countries quickly retrain and re-educate their workforces, the period of structural change could be highly deflationary.
The aging of the US, European and Russian populations. More on that in a moment.
Monetary and fiscal policy. Deflation could inflict serious damage on the US economy due to high household and corporate debt relative to historical levels. Fed governors have stated that they will do everything they can to prevent deflation.
How will these factors play out? Not clear. The forces of inflation versus deflation and the impact of globalization within that have been the subject of intense debate. As the cyclical upswing in the US economy takes hold and the employment data improve, the short-term risk of deflation seems to be receding. But the deflationary forces of globalization and aging are secular, not cyclical, and won't disappear due to a recovery in the US economy. Demography is particularly important, so we'll look at that in more detail now.
The problem of global aging is particularly important for investors, and is becoming more urgent. In 2006, the first of the American "baby-boomers", born in 1946, will reach their 60th birthdays, the earliest legal retirement age. Then, in 2011, they'll be eligable for full retirement benefits.
The impending increase in government benefits payments caused by the retirement of the baby-boomers is occuring at the same time the US is running an unprecendented budget deficit. Think-tanks and policy makers have therefore begun to ask some tough questions:
What will be the impact on the federal budget deficit of the increase in social security and medicare payments?
Will tax rates have to rise to pay for these benefits?
Will a balooning budget deficit push up long-term interest rates?
Can retirees rest assured that their benefits won't be cut?
Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan has raised the public policy issues in speeches and testimony to Congress with increasing frequency lately. He's expressed concern about the budget deficit, but has avoided calling for tax increases or even a reversal of recent tax cuts. Instead, he advocates reducing future benefit payments, partly through the adoption of a new way to calculate the price index that would cut the future value of index-linked benefits.
The result of this debate has been that much of the discussion about global aging has focused on benefit payments, taxes and the budget deficit, and how these factors will impact retirees and workers over future decades. Because rising deficits have historically led to inflation, viewing the global aging issue primarily from the tax and budget deficit perspective has led people to the conclusion that global aging is an inflation problem.
Laurence Kotlikoff and Scott Burns in their book The Coming Generational Storm, for example, paint a picture of aging global populations and then write that:
"The United States is doing all the things that mark an economy soon to be wracked by inflation and a weak currency."
And of course, they specifically mention the large and growing budget deficit. It won't surprise you to hear that Kotlikoff & Burns therefore provide the following investment recommendations:
Buy gold.
Buy real estate.
Buy inflation-protected government bonds (TIPs).
But the assumption that global aging will result in inflation - even given the growing budget deficit - is questionable. First, as Alan Greenspan realizes, most goverment obligations to retirees are index-linked, even if most current government debt is non-index linked. If governments print money to fund their deficits, their future obligations won't go away. Second, the retirement of the baby-boomers could have a strongly deflationary effect.
In Global Aging and Financial Markets, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, author Robert England discusses the possibility that as retirees withdraw money from their savings and pension fund outflows exceed inflows, the resulting sales of equities will massively depress stock prices. Others have discussed the possibility that house prices could decline as retirees move into smaller houses after their children leave home and they reduce their living expenses. And in countries that face population declines, such as Japan, Italy, Germany and Spain, demand for housing will fall.
In two other books, The Great Boom Ahead by Harry Dent and a rather sensationalist short follow-up by Daniel Arnold called The Great Bust Ahead, the authors argue that a reduction in the number of 45 to 55 year olds over the next decade will depress aggregate spending in the US.
These effects - falling equity prices, potentially falling house prices and reduced aggregate demand - are strongly deflationary. Yet Mauldin accepts Kotlikoff & Burn's assertion that population aging will lead to inflation, and adopts their recommendations to buy gold and real estate. Even Jonathan Clements, who writes an excellent personal finance column for the Wall Street Journal, repeated the recommendation to buy real estate by putting money into your own home, based on the assumption that inflation and taxes will both rise due to the aging problem.
Now, don't get me wrong: I'm not coming down on the side of deflation in this debate. However, adopting the assumption that the US faces rising inflation over the next decade without sufficient justification, and investing accordingly in property, gold and other real assets seems premature and risky.
Consider these points:
Japan has been hit by the population aging problem earlier than other countries, and has experienced deflation and significant declines in equity and property prices.
"Gold is a wonderful diversifier, but like any pure commodity that generates no economic return, and whose entire return is based on price speculation, it carries enormous risk". That's a quote from Jack Bogle.
House prices in the US and UK are at historical highs relative to incomes, and have been rising at a rapid rate due to low interest rate mortgage financing. As interest rates rise - particularly if real interest rates are driven up by government borrowing - property prices could take a hit. If they return to historical multiples of average incomes, the decline could be dramatic.
So I think we should approach Mauldin's recommendation to buy value stocks, gold and real estate with caution. If inflation rules, he'll be right. But if deflation rules, these asset classes could prove to be money losers.
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